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Towards Stabilization of Distributed Systems under Denial-of-Service
Shuai Feng, Pietro Tesi, Claudio De Persis
Abstract— In this paper, we consider networked distributed
systems in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks,
namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the commu-
nication network. First, we consider a simple and typical
scenario where communication sequence is purely Round-robin
and we explicitly calculate a bound of attack frequency and
duration, under which the interconnected large-scale system is
asymptotically stable. Second, trading-off system resilience and
communication load, we design a hybrid transmission strategy
consisting of Zeno-free distributed event-triggered control and
Round-robin. We show that with lower communication loads,
the hybrid communication strategy enables the systems to have
the same resilience as in pure Round-robin.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly appealing
for industry nowadays thanks to the development of com-
putation and communication infrastructures. The application
of CPSs ranges from local control systems to large-scale
systems, examples being house temperature control systems
and regional grid control systems. Owing to the advances in
economic and possibly reliability reasons, systems tend to be
large-scale, interconnected and spatially distributed, among
which communications are operated via wireless network
[1]. This triggers the attention towards networked control
of large-scale interconnected systems, which are possibly
safety-critical and potentially exposed to malicious attacks
[?].
The concept of cyber-physical security mostly concerns
security against intelligent attacks. One usually classifies
these attacks as either deceptive attacks or Denial-of-Service
(DoS). Deceptive attacks affect the trustworthiness of trans-
mitted data [3], [4]. Instead, DoS compromises the timeliness
of information exchange, e.g. in the presence of DoS, com-
munications are not possible [5], [6].
This paper investigates DoS attacks. We consider a large-
scale system composed of interconnected subsystems, which
are possibly spatially distributed. The information exchange
between distributed systems and controllers takes place over
a shared communication channel, which implies that all the
communication attempts can be denied in the presence of
DoS.
The literature on distributed/decentralized networked con-
trol [7]–[13] and centralized system under DoS attacks [6],
[14]–[26] is large and diversified. In [12], based on a small-
gain approach, the authors propose a parsimonious event-
triggered design, which is able to prevent Zeno behavior and
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stabilize nonlinear distributed systems asymptotically. In [8],
[10], event-triggered approaches are discussed within large-
scale interconnected systems. By introducing a constant in
the triggering condition, the authors prove that the system
converges to a region around equilibrium without the oc-
currence of Zeno behavior. In [14], the authors consider a
scenario where malicious attacks and genuine packet losses
coexist, where the effect of malicious attacks and random
packet losses are merged and characterized by an overall
packet drop ratio. In [25], the authors formulate a two-player
zero-sum stochastic game framework to consider a remote
secure estimation problem, where the signals are transmitted
over a multi-channel network under DoS attacks. A problem
similar to zero-sum games between controllers and strategic
jammers is considered in [16]. In [18], the authors investigate
DoS from the attacker’s viewpoint where the objective is to
consume limited energy and maximize the effect induced by
DoS attacks. The paper [26] considers a stabilization problem
where transmissions are event-based and the network is cor-
rupted by periodic DoS attacks. In [20], [21], a framework is
introduced where DoS attacks are characterized by frequency
and duration. The contribution is an explicit characterization
of DoS frequency and duration under which stability can be
preserved through state-feedback control. Extensions have
been considered dealing with dynamic controllers [22], [23]
and nonlinear system [24].
In this paper, we consider networked distributed systems
under DoS attacks, which has not been investigated so far
under the class of DoS attacks introduced in [20], [21].
Previously in [20]–[24], the authors analyze the behav-
ior of systems in a centralized-system manner, where the
major characteristic is that all the states are assumed to
be collected and sent in one transmission attempt. In this
paper, we analyze the problem from the distributed system
point of view, where the interconnected subsystems share
one communication channel and transmission attempts of
the subsystems take place asynchronously. The contribution
of this paper is twofold. First, we consider a simple but
typical scenario where the communication sequence is purely
Round-robin and we explicitly compute a bound on attack
frequency and duration, under which the large-scale system is
asymptotically stable. Second, trading-off system resilience
and communication load, we design a hybrid transmission
strategy. Specifically, in the absence of DoS attacks, we
design a distributed event-triggered control using small gain
argument, which guarantees practical stability of the closed-
loop system while preventing the occurrence of Zeno behav-
ior. During DoS-active periods, communication switches to
Round-robin, aiming at quick communication restore. This
hybrid communication strategy surprisingly ends up with the
same bound as pure Round-robin transmission but promotes
the possibility to save communication resources.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the framework of interest along with the considered
family of DoS attacks. In Section III, we present the main
result. We first use small gain approach to study large-scale
system under Round-robin. Subsequently, we introduce the
main result of this paper: the characterization of frequency
and duration of DoS attacks, under which the large-scale
system is asymptotically stable. Section IV briefly introduces
a hybrid transmission design, which achieves the same result
as in Section III with lower communication load. Section
V discusses numerical simulations and Section VI ends
the paper with conclusions and possible future research
directions.
A. Notation
We denote by R the set of reals. Given α ∈ R, we let
R>α (R≥α) denote the set of reals greater than (greater than
or equal to) α. We let N0 denote the set of nonnegative
integers, N0 := {0, 1, . . .}. The prime denotes transpose.
Given a vector v ∈ Rn, ‖v‖ is its Euclidean norm. Given a
matrix M , ‖M‖ is its spectral norm. Given two sets A and
B, we denote by B\A the relative complement of A in B,
i.e., the set of all elements belonging to B, but not to A.
II. FRAMEWORK
A. Networked distributed system
Consider a large-scale system consisting of N interacting
subsystems, whose dynamics satisfy
x˙i(t) = Aixi(t) +Biui(t) +
∑
j∈Ni
Hijxj(t) (1)
where Ai, Bi and Hij are matrices with appropriate dimen-
sions and t ∈ R≥0. xi(t) and ui(t) are state and control
input of subsystem i, respectively. Here we assume that all
the subsystems are full state output. Ni denotes for the set of
neighbors of subsystem i. Subsystem i physically interacts
through
∑
j∈Ni
Hijxj(t) with its neighbor subsystem(s) j ∈
Ni. Here we consider bidirectional edges, i.e. j ∈ Ni when
i ∈ Nj .
The distributed systems are controlled via a shared net-
worked channel, through which distributed plants broadcast
the measurements and controllers send control inputs. The
computation of control inputs is based on the transmitted
measurements. The received measurements are in sample-
and-hold fashion such as xi(t
i
k) where t
i
k represents the
sequence of transmission instants of subsystem i. We assume
that there exists a feedback matrix Ki such that Φi =
Ai + BiKi is Hurwitz. Therefore, the control input applied
to subsystem i is given by
ui(t) = Kixi(t
i
k) +
∑
j∈Ni
Lijxj(t
j
k) (2)
where Lij is the coupling gain in the controller. Here we
assume that the channel is noiseless and there is no quanti-
zation. Moreover, we assume that the network transmission
delay and the computation time of control inputs are zero.
B. DoS attacks–frequency and duration
We refer to Denial-of-Service as the phenomenon for
which transmission attempts may fail. In this paper, we do
not distinguish between transmission failures due to channel
unavailability and transmission failures because of DoS-
induced packet corruption. Since the network is shared, DoS
simultaneously affects the communication attempts of all the
subsystems.
Clearly, the problem in question does not have a solution
if the DoS amount is allowed to be arbitrary. Following
[21], we consider a general DoS model that constrains the
attacker action in time by only posing limitations on the
frequency of DoS attacks and their duration. Let {hn}n∈N0 ,
h0 ≥ 0, denote the sequence of DoS off/on transitions, i.e.,
the time instants at which DoS exhibits a transition from
zero (transmissions are possible) to one (transmissions are
not possible). Hence,
Hn := {hn} ∪ [hn, hn + τn[ (3)
represents the n-th DoS time-interval, of a length τn ∈ R≥0,
over which the network is in DoS status. If τn = 0, then Hn
takes the form of a single pulse at hn. If τn 6= 0, [hn, hn +
τn[ represents an interval from the instant hn (include hn)
to (hn + τn)
− (arbitrarily close to but exclude hn + τn).
Similarly, [τ, t[ represents an interval from τ to t−. Given
τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ , let n(τ, t) denote the number of DoS
off/on transitions over [τ, t[, and let
Ξ(τ, t) :=
⋃
n∈N0
Hn
⋂
[τ, t] (4)
denote the subset of [τ, t] where the network is in DoS status.
The subset of time where DoS is absent is denoted by
Θ(τ, t) := [τ, t] \ Ξ(τ, t) (5)
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: (DoS frequency). There exist constants η ∈
R≥0 and τD ∈ R>0 such that
n(τ, t) ≤ η +
t− τ
τD
(6)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Assumption 2: (DoS duration). There exist constants κ ∈
R≥0 and T ∈ R>1 such that
|Ξ(τ, t)| ≤ κ+
t− τ
T
(7)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Remark 1: Assumptions 1 and 2 do only constrain a
given DoS signal in terms of its average frequency and
duration. Actually, τD can be defined as the average dwell-
time between consecutive DoS off/on transitions, while η
is the chattering bound. Assumption 2 expresses a similar
requirement with respect to the duration of DoS. It expresses
the property that, on the average, the total duration over
which communication is interrupted does not exceed a cer-
tain fraction of time, as specified by 1/T . Like η, the constant
κ plays the role of a regularization term. It is needed because
during a DoS interval, one has |Ξ(hn, hn + τn)| = τn >
τn/T . Thus κ serves to make (7) consistent. Conditions
τD > 0 and T > 1 imply that DoS cannot occur at an
infinitely fast rate or be always active. 
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, our objective is to find stability conditions
for the networked distributed systems under DoS attacks. We
first study the stabilization problem of large-scale systems
under a digital communication channel in the absence of
DoS.
A. A small-gain approach for large-scale systems under
networked communication
For each subsystem i, we denote by ei(t) the error between
the value of the state transmitted to its neighbors and the
current state, i.e.,
ei(t) = xi(t
i
k)− xi(t), i = 1, 2, ..., N (8)
Then combine (1), (2) and (8), the dynamics of subsystem i
can be written as
x˙i(t) = Φixi(t) +BiKiei(t) +
∑
j∈Ni
(BiLij +Hij)xj(t)
+Bi
∑
j∈Ni
Lijej(t) (9)
from which one sees that the dynamics of subsystem i
depend on the interconnected neighbors xj(t) as well as
ei(t), ej(t) and the coupling parameters. Intuitively, if the
couplings are weak and e remains small, then stability can
be achieved. Here, the notion “smallness” of e can be char-
acterized by the x-dependent bound ‖ei(t)‖ ≤ σi‖xi(t)‖, in
which σi is a suitable design parameter. Notice that this is
not the network update rule.
We implement a periodic sampling protocol, e.g. Round-
robin, as our update law. In this respect, we make the
following hypothesis.
Assumption 3: (Inter-sampling of Round-robin). In the ab-
sence of DoS attacks, there exists an inter-sampling interval
∆ such that
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ σi‖xi(t)‖ (10)
holds, where σi is a suitable design parameter. 
For centralized settings, values of ∆ satisfying a bound
like (10) can be explicitly determined. On the other hand, in
[11], [27], the authors compute and apply a lower bound of
time elapsed between two events to prevent Zeno behavior,
where the distributed/decentralized systems are asymptoti-
cally stable. The problem of obtaining ∆ is left for future
research.
As mentioned in the foregoing argument, σi should be
designed carefully. Otherwise, even if there exists a ∆ under
which (10) holds, in the event of an inappropriate σi, stability
can be lost as well.
Given any symmetric positive definite matrix Qi, let Pi
be the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation ΦTi Pi +
PiΦi +Qi = 0. For each i, consider the Lyapunov function
Vi = x
T
i Pixi, which satisfies
λmin(Pi)‖xi(t)‖
2 ≤ Vi(xi(t)) ≤ λmax(Pi)‖xi(t)‖
2 (11)
where λmin(Pi) and λmax(Pi) represent the smallest and
largest eigenvalue of Pi, respectively. The following lemma
presents the design of σi guaranteeing stability.
Lemma 1: Consider a distributed system as in (1) along
with a control input as in (2). Suppose that the spectral radius
r(A−1B) < 1. The distributed system is asymptotically
stable if σi satisfies
σi <
√
li
ji
(12)
where li is the i-th entry of row vector L := µ
T (A−B) =
[l1, l2, ..., lN ] and ji is the j-th entry of row vector J :=
µTΓ = [j1, j2, ..., jN ]. µ ∈ R
N
+ is an arbitrary column vector
satisfying µT (−A + B) < 0. The matrices A, B and Γ are
given by
A =


α1
. . .
αN

 (13)
B =


0 β12 · · · β1N
β21 0 β23 β2N
...
... 0
...
βN1 βN2 · · · 0

 (14)
Γ =


γ11 γ12 · · · γ1N
γ21 γ22 γ23 γ2N
...
...
...
...
γN1 γN2 · · · γNN

 (15)
with
αi = λmin(Qi)− δ −
∑
j∈Ni
2δ (16)
βij =
‖Pi‖
2‖BiLij +Hij‖
2
δ
(17)
γii =
‖Pi‖
2‖BiKi‖
2
δ
(18)
γij =
‖Pi‖
2‖BiLij‖
2
δ
(19)
where δ is a positive real such that αi > 0 and λmin(Qi) is
the smallest eigenvalue of Qi for i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Proof. Recalling that Vi = x
T
i Pixi, the derivative of Vi
along the solution to (9) satisfies
V˙i(xi(t)) ≤ −λmin(Qi)‖xi(t)‖
2
+‖2PiBiKi‖‖xi(t)‖‖ei(t)‖
+
∑
j∈Ni
‖2Pi(BiLij +Hij)‖‖xi(t)‖‖xj(t)‖
+
∑
j∈Ni
‖2PiBiLij‖‖xi(t)‖‖ej(t)‖ (20)
Observe that for any positive real δ, the Young’s inequalities
yield
‖2PiBiKi‖‖xi(t)‖‖ei(t)‖
≤ δ‖xi(t)‖
2 +
‖Pi‖
2‖BiKi‖
2
δ
‖ei(t)‖
2 (21)
‖2Pi(BiLij +Hij)‖‖xi(t)‖‖xj(t)‖
≤ δ‖xi(t)‖
2 +
‖Pi‖
2‖BiLij +Hij‖
2
δ
‖xj(t)‖
2 (22)
‖2PiBiLij‖‖xi(t)‖‖ej(t)‖
≤ δ‖xi(t)‖
2 +
‖Pi‖
2‖BiLij‖
2
δ
‖ej(t)‖
2 (23)
Hence, the derivative of Vi along the solution to (9) satisfies
V˙i(x(t)) ≤ −αi‖xi(t)‖
2 +
∑
j∈Ni
βij‖xj(t)‖
2
+γii‖ei(t)‖
2 +
∑
j∈Ni
γij‖ej(t)‖
2 (24)
where αi, βij , γii and γij are as in Lemma 1. Notice that
one can always find a δ such that αi > 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., N .
By defining vectors
Vvec(xi(t)) := [V1(x1(t)), V2(x2(t)), ..., VN (xN (t))]
T
‖x(t)‖vec := [‖x1(t)‖
2, ‖x2(t)‖
2, ..., ‖xN (t)‖
2]T
‖e(t)‖vec := [‖e1(t)‖
2, ‖e2(t)‖
2, ..., ‖eN(t)‖
2]T
the inequality (24) can be compactly written as
V˙vec(xi(t)) ≤ (−A+B)‖x(t)‖vec + Γ‖e(t)‖vec (25)
with A, B and Γ being as in Lemma 1.
If the spectral radius satisfies r(A−1B) < 1, there exists
a positive vector µ ∈ Rn+ such that µ
T (−A + B) < 0. We
refer readers to [28] for more details. We select the Lyapunov
function V (x(t)) := µTVvec(xi(t)). Then the derivative of
V yields
V˙ (x(t)) = µT V˙vec(xi(t))
≤ µT (−A+B)‖x(t)‖vec + µ
TΓ‖e(t)‖vec
(26)
By noticing that µT (−A+B) < 0, we have
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −L‖x(t)‖vec + J‖e(t)‖vec (27)
where L := µT (A − B) and J := µTΓ are row vectors.
Denote li and ji as the entries of L and J , respectively.
Then, (27) yields
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −
∑
i∈N
li‖xi(t)‖
2 +
∑
i∈N
ji‖ei(t)‖
2
= −
∑
i∈N
(li‖xi(t)‖
2 − ji‖ei(t)‖
2) (28)
which implies asymptotic stability with σi <
√
li
ji
. 
Remark 2: Lemma 1 can only deal with the case where
ji > 0. The case ji = 0 is only possible whenever every
entry in the column i of Γ is zero. In fact, ji = 0 implies that
the error ‖ei(t)‖ never contributes to the system dynamics
via (28), which in turn implies that ‖ei(t)‖ does not affect
stability at all. Therefore, in the case ji = 0, no constraint
on ‖ei(t)‖ is imposed. 
B. Stabilization of distributed systems under DoS
In the previous analysis, we have introduced the design
of a suitable σi and hence error bound, under which the
system is asymptotically stable in the absence of DoS. By
hypothesis, we also assumed the existence of a Round-
robin transmission that satisfies such error bound. In the
presence of DoS, (10) is possibly violated even though the
sampling strategy is still Round-robin. Under such circum-
stances, stability can be lost. Hence, we are interested in
the stabilization problem when the Round-robin network is
under DoS attacks.
Theorem 1: Consider a distributed system as in (1) along
with a control input as in (2). The plant-controller informa-
tion exchange takes place over a shared network, in which
the communication protocol is Round-robin with sampling
interval ∆ as in Assumption 3. The large-scale system
is asymptotically stable for any DoS sequence satisfying
Assumption 1 and 2 with arbitrary η and κ, and with τD
and T if
1
T
+
∆∗
τD
<
ω1
ω1 + ω2
(29)
in which ∆∗ = N∆, ω1 := min{
li−σ
2
i
ji
λmax(Pi)µi
} and ω2 :=
4max{ji}
min{µiλmin(Pi)}
. li, ji, µi and σi are as in Lemma 1.
Proof. The proof is divided into three steps:
Step 1. Lyapunov function in DoS-free periods. In DoS-
free periods, by hypothesis of Assumption 3, (10) holds true
with σi as in Lemma 1 and (28) is negative. Therefore, the
derivative of the Lyapunov function satisfies
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −
∑
i∈N
(li − jiσ
2
i )‖xi(t)‖
2
≤ −
∑
i∈N
li − σ
2
i ji
λmax(Pi)µi
µiVi
= −ω1V (30)
where ω1 := min{
li−σ
2
i
ji
λmax(Pi)µi
}. Thus for t ∈ [hn+ τn, hn+1[
(DoS-free time), the Lyapunov function yields
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1(t−hn−τn)V (x(hn + τn)) (31)
Step 2. Lyapunov function in DoS-active periods. Here
we let zim denote the last successful sampling instant before
the occurrence of DoS. Recalling the definition of ei(t), we
obtain that
ei(t) = xi(z
i
m)− xi(t) = xi(hn)− xi(t) (32)
and
‖ei(t)‖
2 ≤ ‖xi(hn)‖
2 + 2‖xi(t)‖‖xi(hn)‖+ ‖xi(t)‖
2 (33)
for t ∈ Hn. By summing up ‖ei(t)‖
2 for i ∈ N , we obtain∑
i∈N
‖ei(t)‖
2 ≤
∑
i∈N
‖xi(hn)‖
2 +
∑
i∈N
‖xi(t)‖
2
+
∑
i∈N
(‖xi(hn)‖
2 + ‖xi(t)‖
2)
= 2
∑
i∈N
‖xi(hn)‖
2 + 2
∑
i∈N
‖xi(t)‖
2(34)
If
∑
i∈N ‖xi(hn)‖
2 ≤
∑
i∈N ‖xi(t)‖
2, we have that∑
i∈N ‖ei(t)‖
2 ≤ 4
∑
i∈N ‖xi(t)‖
2. Otherwise, we have∑
i∈N ‖ei(t)‖
2 ≤ 4
∑
i∈N ‖xi(hn)‖
2
Recalling (28), it is simple to see that
V˙ (x(t)) ≤
∑
i∈N
ji‖ei(t)‖
2 (35)
Thus, for all t ∈ Hn (DoS-active time) in the case that∑
i∈N ‖xi(hn)‖
2 ≤
∑
i∈N ‖xi(t)‖
2, the derivative of the
Lyapunov function yields
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ max{ji}
∑
i∈N
‖ei(t)‖
2
≤ 4max{ji}
∑
i∈N
‖xi(t)‖
2
≤
4max{ji}
min{µiλmin(Pi)}
∑
i∈N
µiV (xi(t))
= ω2V (x(t)) (36)
with ω2 :=
4max{ji}
min{µiλmin(Pi)}
. On the other hand, for all t ∈
Hn such that
∑
i∈N ‖xi(hn)‖
2 >
∑
i∈N ‖xi(t)‖
2, one has
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ ω2V (x(hn)) (37)
Thus, (36) and (37) imply the Lyapunov function during Hn
satisfies
V (x(t)) ≤ eω2(t−hn)V (x(hn)) (38)
Step 3. Switching between stable and unstable modes.
Consider a DoS attack with period τn, at the end of which
the overall system has to wait an additional period with
length N∆ to have a full round of communications. Hence,
the period where at least one subsystem transmission is
not successful can be upper bounded by τn + N∆. For all
τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ , the total length where communication
is not possible over [τ, t[, say |Ξ¯(τ, t)|, can be upper bounded
by
|Ξ¯(τ, t)| ≤ |Ξ(τ, t)|+ (1 + n(τ, t))∆∗
≤ κ∗ +
t− τ
T∗
(39)
where ∆∗ = N∆, κ := κ+ (1 + η)∆∗ and T∗ :=
τDT
τD+T∆∗
.
Considering the additional waiting time due to Round-
robin, the Lyapunov function in (31) yields V (x(t)) ≤
e−ω1(t−hn−τn−N∆)V (hn + τn + N∆)) for t ∈ [hn +
τn + N∆, hn+1[ and V (x(t)) ≤ e
ω2(t−hn)V (hn) for t ∈
[hn, hn + τn +N∆[.
Thus, the overall behavior of the closed-loop system can
be regarded as a switching system with two modes. Applying
simple iterations to the Lyaponov functions in and out of DoS
status, one has
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1|Θ¯(0,t)|eω2|Ξ¯(0,t)|V (x(0))
≤ eκ∗(ω1+ω2)e−β∗tV (x(0)) (40)
where β∗ := ω1 − (ω1 + ω2)(
∆∗
τD
+ 1
T
). By constraining
β∗ < 0, one obtains the desired result in (29). Hence, stability
is implied at once. 
Remark 3: The resilience of the distributed systems de-
pends on the largeness of ω1 and the smallness of ω2. To
achieve this, one can try to findKi and Lij such that ‖BiKi‖
and ‖BiLij‖ are small. On the other hand, the sampling
interval of Round-robin also affects stability in the sense
that it determines how fast the overall system can restore the
communication. One can always apply smaller Round-robin
inter-sampling time to reduce the left-hand side of (29) at
the expense of higher communication load.
IV. APPROXIMATION OF RESILIENCE WITH REDUCED
COMMUNICATION: HYBRID TRANSMISSION STRATEGY
In the foregoing argument (cf. Remark 3), we have shown
that system resilience depends on the sampling rate of
Round-robin. The faster the sampling rate of Round-robin,
the quicker the overall system restores the communication.
On the other hand, in DoS-free periods, we are interested
in the possibility of reducing communication load while
maintaining the comparable robustness as in Section III. To
realize this, we propose a hybrid transmission strategy: in
the absence of DoS, the communications of the distributed
systems are event-based; if DoS occurs, the communications
switch to Round-robin until the moment where every sub-
system has one successful update.
The advantage of event-triggered control is saving commu-
nication resources. However, the effectiveness of prolonging
transmission intervals, in turn, appears to be a disadvantage
in the presence of DoS. The main shortcoming concerns that
event-triggered control could potentially prolong DoS status.
For example, consider that the sampling strategy is purely
event-based. After a DoS attack, there is a short period where
communications are possible, during which the error bounds
as in (10) are not violated so that systems do not update.
If DoS appears soon, this is equivalent to the scenario that
systems face a longer DoS attack. This indicates that a better
strategy is to save communications in the absence of DoS
and restore communications as soon as possible when DoS is
over, which leads indeed to a hybrid communication strategy.
A. Zeno-free event-triggered control of distributed systems
in the absence of DoS
Abusing the notation, in this section we denote {tik} as
the triggering time sequence of subsystem i under event-
triggered control scheme. For a given initial condition xi(0),
if tik converges to a finite t
i∗, we say that the event-
triggered control induces Zeno behavior [11], [12]. Hence,
Zeno-freeness implies an event-triggered control scheme
preventing the occurrence of Zeno behavior. The following
lemma addresses the Zeno-free event-triggered control.
Lemma 2: Consider a distributed system as in (1) along
with a control input as in (2). Suppose that the spectral radius
r(A−1B) < 1. In the absence of DoS, the distributed system
is practically stable and Zeno-free if the event-triggered law
satisfies
‖ei(t)‖ ≤ max{σi‖xi(t)‖, ci} (41)
in which ci is a positive finite real and
σi < min{
√
li
ji
, 1} (42)
where li and ji are the same as in Lemma 1.
Proof. By Lemma 1 if spectral radius r(A−1B) < 1, (28)
holds true. Then one can observe that the event-triggered
control law (41) would lead (28) to
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −
∑
i∈N
(li‖xi(t)‖
2 − jimax{σ
2
i ‖xi(t)‖
2, c2i })
≤ max{−
∑
i∈N
(li − jiσ
2
i )‖xi(t)‖
2,
−
∑
i∈N
li‖xi(t)‖
2 +
∑
i∈N
jic
2
i }
≤ −
∑
i∈N
(li − jiσ
2
i )‖xi(t)‖
2 +
∑
i∈N
jic
2
i (43)
which implies practical stability with σi < min{
√
li
ji
, 1} and
finite ci.
Then we introduce the analysis about Zeno-freeness of this
distributed event-triggered control law. Since e˙i(t) = −x˙i(t),
then the dynamics of ei satisfy
e˙i(t) = Aiei(t)− Φixi(t
i
k)−
∑
j∈Ni
(BiLij +Hij)xj(t
j
k)
+
∑
j∈Ni
Hijej(t) (44)
From the triggering law (41), one can obtain ‖xi(t
i
k) −
xi(t)‖ ≤ max{σi‖xi(t)‖, ci} and further calculations yield
‖xi(t)‖ − ‖xi(t
i
k)‖ ≤ σi‖xi(t)‖ + ci. Thus, it is simple to
verify that ‖ei(t)‖ ≤ σ¯i‖xi(t
i
k)‖+ σ¯ici, where σ¯i :=
σi
1−σi
.
For each i, at the instant tik+1, ‖ei(t)‖ satisfies
‖ei(t
i
k+1)‖ ≤ fi‖Φi‖‖xi(t
i
k)‖
+fi
∑
j∈Ni
‖BiLij +Hij‖m
+fi
∑
j∈Ni
‖Hij‖σ¯j(m+ cj) (45)
where fi :=
∫ ti
k+1
ti
k
eA(t
i
k+1−τ)dτ , m = max{‖xj(t
j
p)‖} for
tik ≤ t
j
p < t
i
k+1 and j ∈ Ni. Meanwhile, the triggering law
in (41) implies that ‖ei(t
i
k+1)‖ ≥ ci. Then, one immediately
sees that
tik+1 − t
i
k ≥ zi, if µAi ≤ 0,
tik+1 − t
i
k ≥
1
µAi
log(ziµAi + 1), if µAi > 0,
(46)
in which
zi :=
ci
‖Φi‖‖xi(tik)‖ +m
∑
j∈Ni
ζij +
∑
j∈Ni
‖Hij‖σ¯jcj
where ζij := ‖BiLij + Hij‖ + ‖Hij‖σ¯j and µAi is the
logarithmic norm of Ai. Notice that the system is practically
stable, so that ‖xi(t
i
k)‖ and m are bounded. This implies
that zi > 0 and hence t
i
k+1 − t
i
k > 0. 
B. Stabilization of distributed systems with hybrid transmis-
sion strategy under DoS
As a counterpart of Assumption 3, here we assume that
there exists a Round-bobin sampling interval ∆ satisfying
(41). Now we are ready to present the following result.
Theorem 2: Consider a distributed system as in (1) along
with a control input as in (2). The plant-controller infor-
mation exchange takes place over a shared network imple-
menting the event-triggered control law (41) in the absence
of DoS. Suppose that there exists a Round-robin sampling
interval ∆ such that (41) holds. The network is subject
to DoS attacks regulated by Assumption 1 and 2, during
which the communication switches to Round-robin until
every subsystem updates successfully. Then the distributed
system is practically stable if (29) holds true.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, considering
the additional waiting time N∆ due to Round-robin for
the restoring of communications, in DoS-free periods the
Lyapunov function satisfies
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1(t−hn−τn−N∆)V (x(hn + τn +N∆))
+
c
ω1
(47)
for t ∈ [hn+ τn+N∆, hn+1[, where ω1 is as in Theorem 1
and c :=
∑N
i=1 jic
2
i . On the other hand, (38) still holds for
t ∈ [hn, hn + τn +N∆[.
Applying the very similar calculation as in Step 3 in the
proof of Theorem 1, we obtain
V (x(t)) ≤ e−ω1|Θ¯(0,t)|eω2|Ξ¯(0,t)|V (x(0))
+
q∑
n=0
e−ω1|Θ¯(hn,t)|eω2|Ξ¯(hn,t)|
c
ω1
+
c
ω1
≤ eκ∗(ω1+ω2)e−β∗tV (x(0))
+eκ∗(ω1+ω2)
q∑
n=0
e−β∗(t−hn)
c
ω1
+
c
ω1
(48)
where n ∈ N0, q := sup{q ∈ N0|hq ≤ t} and β∗ is as in the
proof of Theorem 1. Notice that t−hn ≥ τDn(hn, t)− τDη
by exploiting Assumption 1. Then, the Lyapunov function
yields
V (x(t)) ≤ eκ∗(ω1+ω2)e−β∗tV (x(0))
+eκ∗(ω1+ω2)+β∗τDη
q∑
n=0
e−β∗τDn(hn,t)
c
ω1
+
c
ω1
(49)
Recalling the definition of Assumption 1, one has that
n(hn, t)− n(hn+1, t) ≥ 1 for t ≥ hn+1. This implies that
q∑
n=0
e−β∗τDn(hn,t) ≤
1
1− e−β∗τD
(50)
Finally, (49) can be written as
V (x(t)) ≤ eκ∗(ω1+ω2)e−β∗tV (x(0))
+
eκ∗(ω1+ω2)+β∗τDη
1− e−β∗τD
c
ω1
+
c
ω1
(51)
If (29) holds, it is simple to verify that β∗ < 0 , which
implies practical stability. 
V. SIMULATION
A. Example 1
The numerical example is taken from [29]. The systems
are open-loop unstable such as
x˙1(t) = x1(t) + u1(t) + x2(t)
x˙2(t) = x2(t) + u2(t)
under distributed control inputs such that
u1(t) = −4.5x1(t
1
k)− 1.4x2(t
2
k)
u2(t) = −6x2(t
2
k)− x1(t
1
k)
Solutions of the Lyapunov equation ΦTi Pi+PiΦi+Qi = 0
with Qi = 1 (i = 1, 2) yields P1 = 0.1429 and P2 = 0.1.
The matrices are A = [0.7 0; 0 0.9], B = [0 0.0327; 0.1 0]
and Γ = [4.1327 0.4; 0.1 3.6] according to Lemma 1.
From these parameters, we obtain that the spectral radius
r(A−1B) = 0.072, σ1 < 0.3765 and σ2 < 0.4657. We let
σ1 = σ2 = 0.2. Based on Assumption 3, we choose Round-
robin sampling interval ∆ = 0.01s.
With those parameters, we obtain the bound ω1
ω1+ω2
≈
0.0175 with ω1 ≈ 3.0149 and ω2 ≈ 169.3061. This implies
that a maximum duty cycle of 1.75% of a sustained DoS
would not destabilize our systems in the example. Actually,
this bound is conservative. The systems in inspection can
endure more DoS without losing stability. As shown in
Figure 1, lines represent states and gray stripes represent the
presence of DoS. Over a simulation horizon of 20s, the DoS
corresponds to parameters of τD ≈ 1.8182 and T ≈ 2.5, and
∼ 40% of transmission failures. According to (29), we obtain
∆∗
τD
+ 1
T
= 0.411 , which violates the theoretical bound, but
the system is still stable.
Meanwhile, the hybrid transmission strategy is able to
reduce communications effectively. As shown in Figure 1.
the transmissions with the hybrid transmission strategy is
only 10% of the transmissions with the pure Round-robin
strategy.
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Fig. 1. Example 1: Top picture—States under pure Round-robin communi-
cation where there are 1200 transmissions in total; Bottom picture—States
under hybrid communication strategy where there are 112 transmissions.
B. Example 2
In this example, we consider a physical system in [30]. The
system is composed of N inverted pendulums interconnected
as a line by springs, whose states are xi = [x¯i, x˜i]
T for i =
1, 2, ..., N . Here, we consider a simple case where N = 3.
The parameters of the pendulums are
A1 = A3 =
[
0 1
−3.75 0
]
, A2 =
[
0 1
−2.5 0
]
B1 = B2 = B3 =
[
0
0.25
]
H12 = H21 = H23 = H32 =
[
0 0
1.25 0
]
The parameter of designed controllers are given by
K1 = K3 = [−23 − 12], K2 = [−18 − 12]
L12 = L32 = [−5 0.25], L21 = L23 = [−4.75 − 0.25]
With the solutions of Lyapunov function ΦTi Pi+PiΦi+Qi =
0 where Qi = I and i = 1, 2, 3, we obtain
A =

 0.67 0 00 0.45 0
0 0 0.67

 ,
B =

 0 0.0608 00.1217 0 0.1217
0 0.0608 0


Γ =

 47.7983 24.4007 022.0276 33.2386 22.0276
0 24.4007 47.7983


With A, B and Γ we obtain that r(A−1B) = 0.2216,
σ1 < 0.0646, σ2 < 0.0844 and σ3 < 0.0646. We select
σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = 0.01. The Round-robin sampling interval is
chosen as ∆ = 0.001s according to Assumption 3. Follow
the same procedures as in Example 1, we obtain ω1
ω1+ω2
≈
0.00012, which is considerably conservative. In fact, if the
systems are under the same DoS attacks as in Example
1, they are still stable, which can be seen from Figure 2.
The conservativeness is due to the unstable dynamics of the
inverted pendulums, the feedback gain Ki and the coupling
parameter Lij in the controllers. It is worth investigating
how to design suitable Ki and Lij to mitigate this effect (cf.
Remark 3).
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Fig. 2. Example 2: Top picture—States under Pure Round-robin communi-
cation during which there are 11997 transmissions; Bottom picture—States
under hybrid communication strategy where there are 254 transmissions .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we investigated the problem of stabilizing
distributed systems under Denial-of-Service, characterizing
DoS frequency and duration under which stability can be
preserved. In order to save communication resources, we also
consider a hybrid communication strategy. It turns out that
the hybrid transmission strategy can reduce communication
load effectively and prevent Zeno behavior while preserving
the same robustness as pure Round-robin protocol.
An interesting research direction is the stabilization prob-
lem of networked distributed systems, where only a fraction
of subsystems, possibly time-varying are under DoS. It
is also interesting to investigate the problem where DoS
attacks imposing on systems are asynchronous with different
frequencies and durations. Finally, in the hybrid transmission
strategy, the effect of event-triggered control with commu-
nication collision can be an interesting direction from a
practical viewpoint.
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